I haven’t run into any analysis of how volatility ought to affect 4th quarter offense as it pertains to taking 2s vs. 3s. If there is a good piece on this out there somewhere, no need to reinvent the wheel. But I would love to know thoughts here (especially from the advanced-stat gurus) about how time left on the clock should be factored into offensive decisionmaking.
It seems obvious to me that, when you’re quite a ways behind, volatility is your friend. And I assume there must be more volatility in 3-point attempts than 2s. So duh, down by 10 or more, aim at the bulls eye.
Less obviously, it seems to me that in close games, it often matters more that you do score than it does how many points you get. So just like you ought to gradually move your retirement account into bonds and away from more volatile stocks as you near your personal end, doesn’t it make sense to think an offense ought to gravitate towards the higher percentage shots—and therefore, presumably, reduce exposure to volatility—as we move into and through the 4th quarter?
Is this right? And if so, what are the implications?
It seems obvious to me that, when you’re quite a ways behind, volatility is your friend. And I assume there must be more volatility in 3-point attempts than 2s. So duh, down by 10 or more, aim at the bulls eye.
Less obviously, it seems to me that in close games, it often matters more that you do score than it does how many points you get. So just like you ought to gradually move your retirement account into bonds and away from more volatile stocks as you near your personal end, doesn’t it make sense to think an offense ought to gravitate towards the higher percentage shots—and therefore, presumably, reduce exposure to volatility—as we move into and through the 4th quarter?
Is this right? And if so, what are the implications?